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Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is a major accomplishment; there is something
to be learned from virtually every page. Ripstein’s goal is to reconstruct and defend
Kant’s argument in the Doctrine of Right, the first part of The Metaphysics of Mor-
als. The force in Ripstein’s title is political force, the state’s entitlement to make its
citizens do or refrain from doing certain things; the freedom is the right of individu-
als to be independent of the choices of others. Kant’s account of the relation between
force and freedom thus understood is novel and striking, and repays close attention.
According to the standard view, exemplified among others by Mill and Rawls, there
is at best a contingent relation between legal and political institutions and conditions
of justice: if people were only nicer to one another there would be no need for such
institutions in the first place. The state is needed because, given the nature of crea-
tures like us, such institutions will most likely lead to happiness ~Mill! or justice
~Rawls! in the long run. So we have a trade-off: justice is purchased with coercion,
and at the expense of freedom.
According to Kant, however, this gets things backwards. For Kant, genuine
freedom consists in being independent of the choices of others. But such indepen-
dence is possible only if there is in place a legal and political order that can deter-
mine and police the boundaries of such interactions. Absent such an order, my ability
to set my own ends will always be subject to the purposes and choices of others,
which is to say that I will not be sui juris, that is, I will not be my own master.
Consequently, in Kant’s view genuine freedom is only possible against the backdrop
of an effective legal order. The relation between force and freedom is therefore a
necessary one.
Ripstein, like Kant, begins with what Kant calls the innate right of humanity,
the “only original right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity.” That right
is “freedom ~independence from being constrained by another’s choice!, insofar as it
can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” ~The
Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 237!. Nota-
bly, Kantian freedom is relational, and concerns one’s ability to determine one’s own
purposes; it says nothing about one’s ability to achieve any particular end. In addi-
tion to the innate right to humanity, that is, freedom, I can also acquire rights: rights
to external objects ~property!, rights to another’s choice to perform an action ~con-
tract!, and rights to persons akin to rights to things ~status!. The acquisition of such
private rights, however, is possible only in a rightful condition, a condition in which
a legislative power makes clear the scope and extent of my acquired rights; in which
an executive power enforces the boundaries of those rights; and in which a judiciary
resolves disputes about unclear cases. A rightful condition, in other words, is nothing
more nor less than civil society.
Readers of this journal will likely be most interested in chapters 6 through 10
of Force and Freedom, where Ripstein discusses the transition from the state of nature
to a rightful condition, and analyzes various principles of public right. The delightful
chapter 8, “Roads to Freedom,” is characteristic of the book as a whole: sophisti-
cated, illuminating and, to this reader at least, very plausible. Imagine a fenced-in
rectangle divided into thirds, with each third owned by a different individual ~call
them Left, Centre, and Right, respectively!. And suppose Left wishes to visit Right.
To do so Left must get permission to cross Centre’s property. But that is just to say
that Left is not genuinely free, since his ability to determine his own purposes and
ends depends in part on Centre’s choices. Left is not his own master because it is not
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up to him where he goes, or how he gets there. The solution, says Kant, are public
roads. Public roads are part of a rightful condition not because they make life easier
for individuals. Rather, public roads are part of a rightful condition because they are
necessary for freedom: without such public thoroughfares individuals would be for-
ever dependent on the choices of others, and so would fail to be sui juris. A similar
strategy can be seen in chapter 9, in which a Kantian argument for taxation and state-
provided welfare is advanced. What is striking about these arguments is their pro-
gression from abstract principles concerning freedom to the conclusion that the state
is required to maintain certain institutions or provide certain public goods in order to
safeguard the independence of individuals from the choices of others.
There is much more in Force and Freedom, including fascinating discussions
of property, contract and consent, punishment, and the right to revolution. But per-
haps Ripstein’s greatest accomplishment in Force and Freedom—beyond showing
Kant’s argument in the Doctrine of Right to be both coherent and plausible—is to
make that argument come alive for contemporary readers. Force and Freedom should
be required reading for anybody wishing to understand Kant’s legal and political phi-
losophy; it should also be read by all those interested in general questions concern-
ing the relationship between freedom, coercion, and justice. There can be little doubt
that this is the book against which all other interpretations of Kant’s legal and polit-
ical theory will be measured.
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This is an excellent collection. While its main focus is clearly on gender and the
state, the book makes important contributions to our understanding of nationalism,
comparative politics, neoliberalism, postcolonialism, risk society and the role of trans-
national actors and NGOs. The collection clearly establishes that analyzing gender
is not just a matter of “adding” insights to existing analyses but that gendered
perspectives often fundamentally challenge the way in which traditional categories
and analyses are constructed. As Yasmeen Abu-Laban makes clear in her introduc-
tion, the collection “is a response to a disciplinary incompleteness in political sci-
ence” ~4!.
All the chapters are of high quality but some are particularly noteworthy. Jill
Vickers reminds Western readers of the subtle, complex and different articulations
between gender and the construction of nation–states in various parts of the world,
problematising some key Western concepts in the process. For example, she points
out that constructions of the nation–state that see it as founded on a public0private
divide with no basis in kinship relations do not work when it comes to analyzing
many non-Western societies. She also points out that women’s role in reproducing
everyday nationalism, for example, via forms of subjectivity, tends to be neglected in
conventional studies. Vickers therefore cautions about universalizing tendencies in
both some Western political theory and Western feminism. Nonetheless, she argues
convincingly that “women’s mediations between modernity and the stability of the
traditional, which anchors people to the past despite rapid change, may be a common
element in the midst of much variability in gender0nation relations” ~39!. Indeed,
she uses this insight to analyze women’s political activism in societies ranging from
India to Quebec.
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